







Keith Frankish (2016) has spelt out an interesting case for illusionism about qualia by positioning it as 
the least unpalatable of three rather defective positions on consciousness. The other two are what he 
calls radical realism (which covers dualism and neutral monism) and conservative realism, a.k.a. non-
eliminativist physicalism. His view, which can be described as conservative eliminativism, denies the radical 
realist’s contention that the world, and especially those portions of it that have minds around, consists 
of more than just physical stuff; but also takes issue with conservative realism (non-eliminativist 
physicalism) despite sharing its commitment to a purely physical ontology. Against conservative 
realism, he argues that it is not possible to be a realist about consciousness and still remain a physicalist; 
and he thinks our reasons for physicalism override our reasons to believe in qualia. My own 
perspective is just the reverse. I hold that our reasons to believe in qualia are stronger than our reasons 
for physicalism – but I also think that qualia realism is compatible with physicalism.  
My remarks will be mostly critical; but I want to register that I have found Frankish’s views not only 
very engaging, but also extraordinarily helpful in orienting myself in the philosophical landscape. In 
the first section I will look at Frankish’s general arguments for illusionism and what a conservative 
realist (i.e., non-eliminativist physicalist) can say in defense of realism. In the second part I will look 
at the plausibility of illusionism in its own right, and in the third highlight some specific problems with 
his account of the nature of the “illusion”.  
I. Physialism vs. scientism  
The most compelling consideration Frankish presents for illusionism is related to a well-known family 
of arguments, let’s call them Gap Arguments, that aim to refute physicalism by appeal of various 
(epistemic, conceptual, and explanatory) gaps between physical and phenomenal descriptions of the 
world which, according to these arguments, provide a priori reason to reject physicalism. Frankish 
puts his concern with conservative (physicalist) realism in a very similar vein:  
The central problem, of course, is that phenomenal properties seem too weird to yield 
to physical explanation. They resist functional analysis and float free of whatever 
physical mechanisms are posited to explain them. (p. 13) 
Here is how this leads to illusionism:  
In general, apparent anomalousness is evidence for illusion. If a property resists 
explanation in physical terms or is detectable only from a certain perspective, then the 
simplest explanation is that it is illusory. In this light, considerations usually cited in 
support of a radical approach to consciousness, such as the existence of an explanatory 
gap, the conceivability of zombies, and the perspectival nature of phenomenal 




After aligning himself with the Gap Arguments for illusionist conclusions, Frankish continues to 
hammer away at realism. He thinks our introspective judgments about conscious experience should 
be discounted because 
…through external inspection of our brain states, they appear to be nonveridical; the 
properties represented do not show up from other perspectives. (p. 16) 
These last remarks expose an important aspect of Frankish’s illusionism. He combines the crucial 
premises of the Gap Argument – in this case, that all truths should be perspicuously explicable from 
the fundamental truths, and the observation that there are no physical explanations of qualia – with 
physicalism to argue that qualia don’t exist. This combination of views supports and feeds on his 
scientism: that the best way to study everything is through science. Though scientism goes beyond the 
metaphysical position Frankish explicitly argues for it is a plausible extension of it and is certainly in 
the background of the views of other notable illusionists Rey (1995) and Dennett (1991).  
I think scientism is, for all the wonderful progress science has made, a theoretical mistake; but one 
with adverse practical consequences. I find the denial of qualia utterly implausible; and scientism a 
misguided way to approach one’s life. There is a concern, expressed in Western philosophy most 
forcefully by Kierkegaard, namely that our experience of life matters in ineffable ways that no objective 
understanding of the world can capture. Wittgenstein, in a well-known letter to Ludwig von Ficker, 
the publisher of the Tractatus, claimed that “the whole point of the book is to show that what is 
important lies in what cannot be expressed” in a scientific language.  
Suppose there was a super-intelligent organism — in a twist on Frank Jackson’s (1982) knowledge 
argument — that lacked any feeling or experience, a creature of pure thought. A purely scientific 
account of humans – though very far from reality – is perhaps not an impossibility. So such a being 
could know everything about humans in biological, neuro-scientific, and information-processing 
terms – even though she lacked the introspective understanding normal humans have of their 
subjective reality. Such a creature would arguably know nothing of value, meaning, and human 
significance.  
This is, of course, a crude opposition. We hardly ever relate to anything purely objectively or purely 
subjectively. But as Kierkegaard pointed out, modern life supports a tendency toward objectivity, while 
in fact, one needs to become subjective, fully immersed in one’s consciousness, to properly understand 
oneself. He said:  
… this is the wonder of life, that each man who is mindful of himself knows what no 
science knows, since he knows who himself is…  (1980, pp 78-79) 
 
So I reject scientism in any of its forms. I believe that if the existence of qualia was incompatible with 
physicalism it would be reason to reject physicalism (rather than embrace it and scientism, as Frankish 
does). But I do not think that the existence of qualia and subjectivity is incompatible with physicalism. 
While I would rather give up physicalism before I’d embrace scientism and give up belief in first 
person authority about the mind, I do not think this is a choice forced on physicalism. One can have 
physicalism without the scientism and illusionism about qualia. It is tenable that purely physical minds 
conceive of their own contents, and especially their (real) qualitative states in a way that is inaccessible 
to and isolated from the point of view of science. Of course, given physicalism, no facts exist that do 
not have an exhaustive third person account, but this doesn’t exclude first person takes on the world 




This is exactly the perspective of what has become known as the “phenomenal concept strategy” 
(Stoljar 2005).  The strategy is based on an idea first articulated by Brian Loar (1990/1997) that the 
epistemic, conceptual and explanatory gaps between phenomenal and physical descriptions can be 
explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts, thereby obviating both the illusionist, and 
the anti-physicalist response to the gaps. Phenomenal concepts, on this proposal, involve unique 
cognitive mechanisms, but none that could not be fully physically implemented.  
The key idea of the phenomenal concept strategy is to give an account of how phenomenal concepts 
can refer to conscious states directly and yet in a substantive manner, even while supposing that they refer 
to physical (plausibly, neural) states in the brain, via entirely physical mechanisms. On this view, both 
qualia and the phenomenal concepts we apply to them, are physical; but phenomenal concepts involve 
unique cognitive mechanisms that set them apart – in fact, isolate them – conceptually from scientific 
concepts. Loar’s core idea is that when a person is having a particular experience she can deploy a 
concept that refers directly to the experience and that in some way involves in its mode of presentation 
the very experience it refers to, and that this account of phenomenal concepts is entirely neutral with 
regard to the metaphysical status of conscious states; that is, entirely neutral on the question of whether 
qualia are physical or irreducibly mental. It also explains why physicalism about qualia seems to be 
puzzling.  
One way to understand this idea, the one I favor, is to hold that phenomenal concepts are partly 
constituted by tokens of the phenomenal experiences they refer to (Balog 2012a, 2012b; Block 2006; 
Chalmers 2003; and Papineau 2002). On this view, a token phenomenal experience is part of the token 
concept referring to it, and the experience – at least partly – determines that the concept refers to the 
experience it contains a token of.  Of course, “part” does not mean “spatial part” but rather that it is 
metaphysically impossible to token the concept without tokening an instance of its referent.  
This account of phenomenal concepts is not intended to apply to all concepts that refer to phenomenal 
states or states but only to what we might call “direct phenomenal concepts”. Of course most of our 
reference to phenomenal states and qualia do not contain the phenomenal states themselves. Clearly, 
a person can token a concept that refers to pain without her literally experiencing pain – these can be 
called “indirect phenomenal concepts” – as when she replies to her dentist’s question by “I am not in 
pain” or when one sees another person stub her toe and thinks “that hurts”. But for the purposes of 
discussion it is appropriate to focus on direct phenomenal concepts since these are the ones that 
generate the puzzlement over qualia. 
 
If the above account is right, phenomenal concepts have very special realization states: the neural states 
realizing these concepts are instances of the very same neural states types the concepts refer to. What 
is so special about phenomenal concepts, on this account, is not only that their realization states are 
instances of their referents, but that this very fact is crucially involved in determining their meaning. In 
other words, not only are these concepts realized by instances of their referents, but they refer to what 
they do at least in part in virtue of this fact. This is, of course, very different from any other concept. 
Most concepts are not realized by tokens of their referents at all; but even those, like the concept 
ATOM, that are, mean what they do completely independently of this fact about realization.  This also 
means that the cognitive mechanisms involved in phenomenal concepts guarantee that we will be 




Let me briefly explain how the constitutional theory of phenomenal concepts accounts for the 
explanatory gap. Recall that the problem of the explanatory gap is that no amount of knowledge about 
the physical facts (brain functioning and so on) is able to explain why a particular brain state/process 
has a particular feel, e.g., feels giddy. This contrasts, for example, with the way the fact that water is 
composed of H2O molecules together with physical and chemical laws explains why water is potable, 
transparent and so on. The explanation of why H2O behaves in watery ways (together with the fact 
that water is composed of H2O molecules) straightforwardly explains the behavior of water. Since we 
can’t explain why a brain state feels giddy in neurophysiological terms, we can’t close the physical-
phenomenal explanatory gap.  
 
The constitutional account explains the gap by appealing to the substantial and direct grasp phenomenal 
concepts afford of their referent. When I focus on the phenomenal state, I have a “substantial“ grasp 
of its nature. I grasp what it is like to be in that phenomenal state – in terms of what it’s like to be in that 
same state. This is what the constitutional account captures. And because this grasp is at the same time 
direct, that is, independent of any causal or functional information (unlike in the case of WATER), 
information about the functioning of the brain simply won’t explain what it’s like to be in that state.  
What exactly is this substantial insight into the nature of phenomenal states? If phenomenal concepts 
are partly constituted by phenomenal states, our knowledge of the presence of these states (when we 
apply these direct phenomenal concepts) is not mediated by something distinct from these states. 
Rather the state itself serves as its own mode of presentation. When I focus on the phenomenal quality 
of an experience – not on what it represents but on its qualitative character – my representation 
contains that very experience. Thinking about it and simply having the experience will then share 
something very substantial, very spectacular: namely the phenomenal character of the experience. 
Being aware of our phenomenal states – being acquainted with them (Russell 1910) – is the special, 
intimate epistemic relation we have to our phenomenal experience through the shared phenomenality of 
experience and thought. Shared phenomenality produces the sense that one has a direct insight into 
the nature of the experience. And it seems puzzling, to say the least, how this nature could be physical. 
But it is important to notice that this kind of direct insight (via shared phenomenality of thought and 
experience) into the nature of conscious experience does not reveal anything about the metaphysical 
nature of phenomenality.  It is not the same sense of “insight into the nature of X” as a scientific 
analysis of a brain state would provide. The one involves having the state, the other, analyzing it into 
its components, which are very different activities.  
So the constitutional account of phenomenal concepts offers a solution to the mind-body problem 
that steers clear of both radical realism and illusionism. As a matter of fact, it tackles head on the main 
reason Frankish cites for illusionism, that is, the existence of epistemic/conceptual/explanatory gaps 
between the physical and the phenomenal; and concludes that it is not a good reason to give up either 
physicalism or realism. Though Frankish mentions this approach, he dismisses it quickly, without 
much discussion.  
In contrast, I think we should not take qualia lightly, and should look very seriously at views that could 
ground a physicalist realism about qualia. Illusionism should only be considered after all other avenues 
have been exhausted. Just as illusionism about the external world is hard to take seriously even though 
in a certain sense it fits our data well, illusionism about qualia should not be invoked lightly. Belief in 
the existence of qualia is just as foundational for our world view as – and some would say even more 
so than – belief in the existence of the external world. It takes much more to make it a plausible 
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position than simply showing that it is – at least prima facie – coherent and fits some other, initially 
plausible, principles.  
II. The plausibility of illusionism 
Frankish makes an attempt to neutralize the inherent implausibility of illusionism by explaining our 
stubborn (and supposedly erroneous) sense that we are phenomenally conscious. According to 
illusionism when we are introspectively aware of our sensory states our awareness is partial and 
distorted, leading us to misrepresent the states as having phenomenal properties. So though nothing in 
this world, as a matter of fact, instantiates phenomenal properties, it still appears to us that our 
experiences do.  
 
Frankish then tries to coax us to see his claim that introspection misrepresents as plausible. But the 
analogies he supplies fail to convince. He refers to Dennett’s analogy with computer graphics.  
 
The icons, pointers, files, and locations displayed on a computer screen correspond in 
only an abstract, metaphorical way to structures within the machine, but by 
manipulating them in intuitive ways we can control the machine effectively, without 
any deeper understanding of its workings. The items that populate our introspective 
world have a similar status, Dennett suggests. They are metaphorical representations 
of real neural events, which facilitate certain kinds of mental self-manipulation but 
yield no deep insight into the processes involved. (p. 5) 
 
As Frankish himself points out, this analogy is quite imperfect. Introspection is not like looking at a 
computer screen; and computer icons are not misrepresentations either. No one who uses a computer 
really thinks that computer files are located on the screen or that they look like their icons.  
 
Frankish also cites Rey (1995, pp. 137-9) who explains the illusion of qualia as similar to other illusions 
where stabilities in our reactions to the world induce us to project corresponding properties onto the 
world (e.g., our stable personal concerns and reactions to others lead us to posit stable, persisting 
selves as their objects). Again, while this mechanism is contentious even as an explanation of our 
concept of self, it doesn’t seem to be similar at all to how our introspective phenomenal concepts 
work. When we form an introspective phenomenal concept of a pain sensation in the act of attending 
to it, we are not conceptually engaging, much less projecting stable personal concerns and reactions; 
we simply mentally note the pain. We can be aware of qualia via simple direction of attention. 
Everybody can do this and there is nothing tendentious about it. It is just a bedrock feature of what it 
is to be a human being.  
 
Despite Frankish’s examples and explanations, I find illusionism extraordinarily implausible simply 
because it flies in the face of one of the most fundamental ways the world presents itself to us: the 
awareness of our own mind. Illusionism perhaps sounds plausible, or at least conceivable, from the 
third person, scientific perspective we can take on mental representation. From this point of view, it 
is possible to argue that organisms have no introspective way of checking the accuracy of their 
introspective representations, and so they cannot rule out the possibility that these representations are 
non-veridical. 
It is clearly the case that science and objective philosophizing might dislodge deeply held common 
sense views. Obvious examples are the nature of physical objects, and, more controversially, the nature 
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of the self and free will. But the case of qualia is not like that. Arguably, pace Frankish, there are no 
scientific or philosophical discoveries that force us to give up belief in qualia; and there is no 
demonstrable conceptual incoherence in our introspective concepts of qualia. So the question comes 
down to the epistemic authority accorded to introspective awareness vs. scientific theorizing.  
 
It seems that Frankish has a negative view of qualia and their role in our life. He, in the strange 
expression he uses, finds qualia potentially embarrassing. He thinks that illusionism can eliminate the 
embarrassment and clear away the obstacles from taking qualia seriously. As he puts it  
 
But if phenomenal properties are intentional objects, a sort of mental fiction, then we 
need no longer be embarrassed by them. We can acknowledge how magical and 
unearthly they are and how powerfully they affect us, as intentional objects. In this 
sense, illusionists may claim to take consciousness more seriously than realists do. 
 
But there are also signs that Frankish is not completely at ease with illusionism.  
III. An illusion of illusion? 
Some aspects of Frankish’s presentation of illusionism strikes me as covert attempts to smuggle qualia 
in through the back door. He seems to me to appeal – illicitly – to qualitative properties in explicating 
and motivating his own denial of them. First I will talk about problems regarding reference to non-
existent qualia; then I will make some remarks about Frankish’s treatment of what it is like to have an 
experience. 
A) Phenomenal concepts 
The heart of illusionism is the view that introspection misrepresents sensory experience as having 
certain qualitative properties nothing in fact has. But given how vivid our grasp of these allegedly 
uninstantiated properties are, one is owed an explanation how, and through what mechanism we can 
latch onto something that doesn’t exist in such a revealing way? The story, of course, cannot be along 
the lines our concept “unicorn” works; our phenomenal concepts are simple and direct in a way that 
precludes construction from other, bona fide referring concepts. As Levine (2001, pp. 146-7) has 
observed, there appears to be a problem accounting for the infinitely rich ways in which these concepts 
apparently refer to an infinitely rich field of phenomenal properties. It is very challenging to explain 
what it means to represent phenomenality directly – if there is no such thing.  
Frankish’s answer doesn’t come close to meeting the challenge: 
 
A better option may be to adopt some form of functional-role semantics for 
phenomenal concepts, on which their content is fixed by their role in mental 
processing, including their connections to other concepts, to nonconceptual sensory 
and introspective representations (their own content determined causally or 
functionally), and to associations, behavioural dispositions, and so on.  
 
This is, unfortunately, little more than hand-waving about how reference to non-existent (or non-
instantiated) properties with direct modes of presentation can be established. And in fact there is 
reason to be suspicious that such an account could ever be found. The problem can be stated as a 
dilemma. Either introspective concepts refer to real properties so introspection results in meaningful 
even though erroneous representations; or they don’t really refer to any property.  In the first case, 
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one just wonders what miracle could ensure that people refer directly to all those wonderful qualitative 
and subjective properties even though nothing in the world instantiates them? And in the second, all 
our introspective qualia representations would simply be meaningless, mental junk, so to speak. So 
the account either requires a miracle, or collapses into meaninglessness.  
 
I suspect that there is a tacit appeal to qualia in illusionism which makes it initially plausible. Because 
in reality we are all acquainted with qualia, we don’t get worried about the idea that introspective 
representations can refer to them. But when we realize what the account says, namely that nothing 
has qualia, it should really strike us as utterly miraculous that, if the account was true, we could refer to 
them.  
 
B) The “what it is like” of experience  
While illusionism denies the existence of qualia, Frankish seems to want to allow that there is 
something it is like to think about experience, and even talks about “introspective subjectivity”. One 
might wonder: where is the illusion then? It would be pointless to deny that experience has qualitative, 
subjective properties only to allow introspective representation of experience to have them.  That 
would still be a realist position. So the illusionist’s “what it is like” must be construed otherwise than 
as “having qualitative features”. Here is how Frankish explains the distinction: 
Illusionists can say that one’s experiences are like something if one is aware of them 
in a functional sense, courtesy of introspective representational mechanisms. Indeed, 
this is a plausible reading of the phrase; experiences are like something for a creature, 
just as external objects are like something for it, if it mentally represents them to itself. 
Illusionists agree that experiences are like something in this sense, though they add 
that the representations are nonveridical, misrepresenting experiences as having 
phenomenal properties (what-it-is-likeness in the first sense). (p. 11) 
 
Even assuming that it is supposed to be a constitutive account of what it is like-ness, this is not very 
helpful. To create a new sense of “what it is like”, it not only has to be different from “having qualia 
properties”, but it also has to be discernably different from concepts of mere function and 
representation – otherwise invoking the expression “what it is like” is just a funny way to dress up 
“function” and “representation” talk. It is a redefinition of the concept “what it is like”, rather than a 
new understanding of it. It introduces no new insight about experience.  
 
Nevertheless, Frankish seems to think that his new concept of “what it is like” really does speaks to 
our ordinary notion of what it is like. He uses the account to dispel misconceptions about zombies: 
 
[the illusion] depends on a complex array of introspectable sensory states, which 
trigger a host of cognitive, motivational, and affective reactions. If we knew everything 
about these states, their effects, and our introspective access to them, then, illusionists 
say, we could not clearly imagine a creature possessing them without having an inner 
life like ours. (p. 12) 
 
Assuming that this is not merely a claim about imagination, but about conceivability, this indicates 
that according to Frankish, suitable claims about representation and function conceptually necessitate 
claims about what it is like to be a creature entertaining those representations. This would indicate 
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that he indeed provided a functional-representational notion of what it is like-ness – not merely a 
pseudo-what it is like-ness concept. But this flies in the face not only of what most philosophers 
believe about phenomenal concepts (that they do not have conceptually sufficient conditions in 
functional/representational terms), but also of the main reason Frankish presented for illusionism: the 
Gap Arguments. If zombies are unimaginable, indeed inconceivable, then the case for radical realism 
vanishes and conservative realism becomes a viable option.  
 
So I think Frankish overplays his hand with his claim that he can account for the what it is like-ness 
of experience. It might be that even for an illusionist, the allure of qualia is too strong to resist. But 
trying to have his cake and eat it will in philosophy, as in the kitchen, get you into trouble when 
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